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JURG5N MOLTMANN'S wTH!50LOGY OP HOPE"

A Brief Purport

Rod Crowell

Preface

This "brief purport" besan as a critique* In the
best of intentions, however, seal quickly outran intelligence, and the need to get a firm grip on the thought of
Jur^en Moltroann became tantamount to producing anything at
all. The strange new territory of dialectical theology,
coupled with the added handicap of formulating and answering
my own questions, forced reconsideration of this project's
direction and purpose*
Accordingly, the intention of this paper has shifted

to a practical (and less scholarly) level that is in
consonance with my limited abilities* It is written for
those professional ministers who have found keeping up
with rapidly succeeding theologies to be a luxury in their
crowded schedules* To them I dedicate this presentation*
hoping to sain some sympathy for it in the process*
I am indebted to Rev* Ken Downing of Sheridan* Michigan

for the use of his libraryi Rev* William Hastings of Fredonia,
New York for his most welcome oommentst Rev* Francis Turpin
of Athens, Michigan and Guntram Bisohoff, Th*D* Western

Michigan University for their help—and most especially,
I wish to thank Otto Grundler, Th*D, Western Michigan
University, whose patient guidance as advisor for this
project has made this the enjoyable and challenging exper
ience education should always be*

Western Michigan University

April 17* 1972
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Introduction

"A thing is alive only when it contains contra*
dlotion in itself and is indeed the power of
holding the contradiction within Itself and
enduring it*"

—Jurgen Moltmann, citing ft«W«F* Hegel

Theology of Hops is a combination of three theses•

l)m critique o? the modern view of the "self" as over
against the empirical "world", 2) an argument for a political
hermeneutios of the Bible which illuminates Christian exist

ence as bound up in the dialectical relation between the
suffering of the present and the promise of future deliver
ance, and 3) an examination of the present position of the
Christian church in modern society and outline of the function
it should have in an eschatologlcal interpretation of its
own existence*

In this book, Moltmann rightfully points out that man
experience history in the modus of being and having t he is

both actor and spectator in the unfolding of history*1
While history is an expression of man's being, it also shapes
his possibilities for the future in a collective sense*
This very important fact has been handled poorly in twentieth
century thoughti scientists deny the effect of history upon
their "world" of causal laws* while existential philosophers
subordinate history to man's power of choice* The result is
that we have two modern definitions of "world", which is either

a body of eternal, empirical "facts"—or else it is the "world"
of your own possibilities*
During the reign of modern thinking (which* since

Descartes* has consisted of distorting the mind/body dualism
in different ways) Christian theology built upon its Thoraistic
foundations a system that was largely comfortable with the
view of the scientific universe* While Christian theologians
would occasionally insist upon a patently ridiculous statement*
their agreement that faith in God did not cast doubt upon the

"veriflability" of the physical world or the sphere of ethics
won them a tenative membership, at least, in the club of
Rational Men* The steady incorporation of modern scientific

and philosophical ideas into Christian theology appears

clearly in the church todayi

its loss of hope for the future

of the world reflects the scientific view of the universe as

a thing totally distinct from man* following immutable laws*

In like fashion, the church's lack of hope for the

future of mankind as a totality reflects the existential
reduction of the "world" to the world which individuals
encounter as islands in the stream of time* The existen

tial "search for the meaning of Being" has become in the
church a "search for personal fulfillment" which shuts out
the cries of the "wretched of the earth"*

Many times in

early Christianity* the feeling of premature fulfillment
has broken the bond uniting Spirit and missions the ironic
exclamations of Paul in 1 Corinthians k is directed against
such a feeling*

In the theology of hope, the final things in Christianity*
namely judgment and the ensuing new age, place a creative
tension upon the events of the present that heightens aware
ness of our missions and the awareness of spiritual communi

cation with God* But why hope, one may interrupt to ask*
Isn't hope an opiate* a justification for suffering? As
rational men* don't we realise that our hoped-for future is
continually delayed? Hope is an illusion, and we must recon
cile ourselves to what IS,

This form of realism might be

called by its proper name a fear of dj appointment, "For
whoever would save hie life will lose iti and whoever loses

his life for my sake and the gospel's will save it*" (SSark 8i35)
It is not enough to answer the question, "Are you saved?"

with another question—"Saved from what?"* The proper
answer is more accurately, "No* I am not saved* I am lost

In hope that I might be saved when the Kingdom comes*"

The

realisation that the Christian mission is not yet finished
is the ground* in part* of the Christian hope*

Ever since men acquired the ability to completely
obliterate themselves in a nuclear holocaust* the future of
mankind has taken on a universal cast* It is only by the

formation of a total community that we can manage to survive*
This universal horlson is found in Christian eschatology*

with its power of anticipation* In such a dynamic eschatology*
our hope for the end of history brings a glorious vision into
tension with our present reality of suffering! the world is

seen in the light of the "not-yet"2 and the great difference
between vision and reality provides the point of tension in
which man's Identity can truly be said to reside* The
contradiction between future and present is the contradiction
which Christians are called to recognise and strive to overcomet

for one cannot await such a universal future passively*

He must be in correspondence with it in the liberation of the

oppressed and in the renewal of all life*3 it is in this
respect that eschatology is east as a political hermeneutic*
The danger that secular liberation groups which have preserved
the element of hope during this century will tire and lapse

Into cynicism is a threatening one*

Only that vision which

is Christian can prevail, for it promises a new Creation*
That such a contradiction as crucifixion and resurrection is

the announcement of hope is something that does not rest on
the capriclousness of reason, but Is a constant apprehension
in faith*

SECTION ONE*
A*

THE "THEOLOGf OF HOPE"

Transcendental Eschatology in Philosophy

Eschatology, the doctrine of the "last things", is a
unique and quite Judaic idea* The "first things" it corresponds
to is the promise made by Jahweh to Abraham* It only makes
sense, then* to assert that whatever use the term gets must
be related to the nature of this promise and to the God who
reveals himself in the history of this promise, that is* in
events* Otherwise* the term rests on a philosophical (and
specifically Greek) concept of the divine revelation which
descends to add only to man's momentary self-understanding*
and not on the God of the promise.*

But how else could

eschatology have been pushed to the back of Christian dogmatics
if it had not been given this Hellenistic twist? Clearly, this
is what has occurred* and Moltmann locates the modern source

of this ahlstorical brand of eschatology* which he calls
"transcendental eschatology"* in Kant*

Kant states in Das

Ende aller Dingo (179*0 that knowledge of the "last things*
cannot be intellectual! however* he says, they acquire through
the practical reason an ethical significance* This originates
in the strange Kantian observation that whatever Idea the
speculative reason finds void of meaning has been given by the
practical reason with the Intention that we should make the

idea mean something in that sphere "according to the relation

it bears to our perceptive faculty*"

It does not have

speculative, but practical meaning* In this manner* Kant has
actually excluded the eschatological categories of hope* so

that present reality can now be rationalised—and the conditions
of this present reality we confront acquire an unchangeable
nature• 5 it le only in Kant's transcendental, moral realm
that man escapes the laws of causality and discovers certain
things to be determinable by himself*

Two modern theologians, Karl Berth and Rudolf Bultmann*
have shown their affinities with Kant's basic scheme*

For

both of them, the eschaton Is the "moment bearing the unborn
secret of revelation" and thus the boundary between time and
eternity•* Their point of difference is the nature of God*
Berth holds to God'e absolute difference from man* and Bultmann
presupposes an analogla entlst hence, for Barth, God reveals
himselfi and for Bultmann, it is man who must awaken the

revelation within himself* While Barth's thought opene man
to the world in a libertine fashion* it closes out the Kingdom*
What fulfillment could exist after the disclosure of the

eternal? Bultmann, on the other hand* allows the possibility
of being "open to the future" at the expense of closing out
the world* It becomes dead matter which follows the laws of
physics* as in Kant*

We must concern ourselves with another interpretation
of eschatology at this point* redemptive history* While this
is a pre-Kantian development* it nonetheless receives a grounding
in philosophy* The eschaton is transformed, via Aristotelian
metaphysics* into the purpose of all effecient causes in history*
History then replaces God as the source of revelation, and the
final result is given an attractive name—"the long march from
animality to freedom" in its Hegelian description*

Yet history cannot be understood as a pa *h to perfection
or as an epiphany of man that he "awakes"* or even as an object

confronting us (as in Kant) for the simple reason that history
Is also the history of the physical world—and all of these
interpretations presuppose that the universe follows eternal
laws*

History in this new* broader sense is closer to the

Judaic view of the way in which God reveals himself• The
eschaton is now back in its proper place at the end of history*
History* however* eaimot be a direct revelation of God* for

such a statement can be made only when history has been
completed* It is then an indirect revelation of God* This
interpretation* as advanced by Wolfhart Pannenberg* is an
improvement ever the others in that it is truly a universal
history* But it is not universal enough, for it deprives
the risen Christ of a future t

Now the connection between

Old Testament and New is sharply brought into question*
Christ is proclaimed not only within the eschatologloal
horison of the resurrection of the dead, but also as the
"resurrection and the life" himself*/

The Christian church

finds its future in Christ* the Christ who is also the "crucified

one".
cross*

So Christian eschatology must be an eschatology of the
In face of the enormous difference between cross and

resurrection Jesus is the same* His identity is bound up
within this very contradiction, which anticipates his not-yet
apparent future*

The Easter appearances of the risen Lord,

then* show him not as he is* but as what he will be*8

9t
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We have distinguished Moltmann's eschatology of the
croae from other* more philosophical Interpretations of
eschatology* Now we must set his interpretation in the
context of the Judaic promise, that it may be defined more
clearly* Several questions immediately arises How is the
revelation of the divine in Judaism different from other

religions which appear to have common structures of myth
and hierophany?

Secondly, if it is different, how Is the

revelation of the God of the promise to be understood apart
from the entry of the eternal into the temporal? Finally*
how can Christ be understood theologically ae an extention
and partial validation of the promise?

It should be cl~ar that Israel was little concerned

with understanding the appearances or self-revelations

of God*

Instead, the appearance of God was Immediately

linked up with the uttering of a word of divine promise*
His very appearance "points away" from Itself to the future
which it announces* While the appearance of Cod is consid
ered to be the entry of the eternal into the temporal* the
effect of the appearance ie not such that it brings the
hearers of the promise Into a realisation of their incon
gruence with the "eternal presence"* No, it is rather that
the hearers realise their incongruence with the reality
around them, and break away from the bondage of the present

in hope of the future*"

Knowledge of God in these terms

does not become mn intimate knowledge! but rather* in
successive appearances, he is re-oognised in his historic
faithfulness* As Martin Buber points out* knowledge of God
begins with two experiences, and one identifies the God in
each of these two experiences as being the same one*

Cognition begins with re-cognition.i0
say that
mine why
happened
delaying

This does not mean to

the promise should be used against Itself to deter
it has not been fulfilled! indeed* this is what
in Judaism, nan was the one thought guilty of
the promise* and from this reflection grew a cult

of obedience and resentence*

But this idea supposes that

man has the power to bring the promise to fulfillment—God's

faithfulness has been pushed aside*
The horison of the promise expanded in prophetic and
apocalyptic eschatology. Prophetic eschatology expanded the
notions of covenant (Jer. 31*31-40) end judgment (Amos 1-2)
to Include other nations. An excellent example of this is
found also in Hossa 2t23* "• . • and I will have pity on
Not pitied* and I will say to Not my people* •You are my
people's and he shall say, *Thou art ray God*f" Jahweh's
lordship over all nations now figures in the eschaton. as

does the belief that Jahweh will turn Judgment into blessing
and new creation—a typical occurrence in prophetic literature*
A different outlook evolves in apocalyptic literature—so
different that Old Testament scholars are divided as to

whether it is a continuation of prophetic literature or a
result of the duallstlc picture of Iranlanism* The deter
ministic view apocalypticism takes of history stands in
sharp contrast to the call to repentance found in the prophets*
Apocalypticism asserts that the world lies under the influence

of evil, that judgment is an inescapable fate* and that this
world of evil will be replaced by the coming world of righteous*

noes* This is an extreme dualism not found in the prophets*11
The apocalyptic literature applies cosmologies! patterns to
hi storyi for many years Christian theology saw this as a
cosmologies! Interpretation of esehatological history*
nut there is another alternative• might it not represent
an esehatological interpretation of the cosmos?

This other

alternative is quite a different thing* as Moltmann indicates!

It might well be that the existing cosmic bounds

of reality, which the moving historic horizon of
the promise reaches in eschatology* are not regarded
as fixed and predetermined things* but are themselves
found to be in motion*

It might well be that once

the promise becomes eschatological it breaks the
bounds even of that which aetiology had hitherto
considered to be creation and cosmos* with the

result that the eschaton would not be a repetition
of the beginning • • • but is ultimately wider
than the beginning ever was* Then it would not
be the case that eschatology becomes cosmological
in apocalyptic, and is thereby stabilized, but
vice versa cosmology would become eschatological

and the cosmos would be taken up in terms of
history into the process of the eschaton*I2

The universe no longer is seen as mechanistic*
Instead, it splits into aeons of the apocalyptic process—

into a world that is coming and one that is passing away.
Everything is now bound up in God*s process of history*
The final question now remains to be answered* How
shall we understand Christ and the Gospel in relation to
the promise to Abraham? Two ways immediately present
themselves t understanding the connection between the two
Testaments as a historic continuity, with the resurrection
representing the fulfillment of the Old Testamenti or inter
preting the connection as one of discontinuity* that is*
regarding the connection between Christ and Abraham as a
retrospective projection of faith whloh oan only be captured
Individually* Yet both of these interpretations clearly
shew the one-sided attitude Christian theology has taken
toward the Old Testament* It regards it as either a
historic documentation of the Gospel or as a list of the
ways In which the Judaic law contributed to human fallings*
(Whether or not these attitudes can be attributed to the

apostle Paul is still a bone of contention for scholars*)
In Moltmann* 8 view of Christian eschatology* the Gospel
cannot present itself as total fulfillment of vie promise
because there are eschatological promisee made in the Old
Testament whieh have not yet been fulfilled* Christianity
must link up with those promises In a judicial process with

Judaism, and present those promises j&png wltft the future of
Christ*1? The future of the promise, like the future of
Christ* is still incomplete* In the Gospel* the promise
finds a new* eschatological future (and a new history)—while
the law finds its end*

The dialectical connection between promise and gospal
nay still not ha dear* so X hope that the following diagram
and explanation will suffice t

(a history of the working
of the traditional hope
as determined by the
announcement of the future

inherent in the promise)

PROMISE

i; validation of gospel
2) haa its C3K88 time in

1) validationof promlaT^
2) enters into judicial

the future

process with Judaism
concerning future of the
promise

THE IDENTITY OF JESUS

Resurrection
unbelief

feeling of utter

on the part
of the disciples

nihil

1) announcement of hope

by the God of the
Jewa

2) creation out of the

feeling of n|W

8

Word history* whieh continually Interprets the present
In relation to the history of the promise and in relation to
the announced future in the promise, binds gospel and promise
xogexner in
in such
sucn a
a fashion
xasnion that
xnax the
xne ruxure
together
future of hope
promise Is inseperable from a hope for the future.

chHstTl* The identity of Jesus is pound up
i in* i
outside of*
of, the two radically different experiences
exi
of the
disciplest a feeling of utter nihil In the crucifixion which
extends even to God—and an overcoming of the nihil in the
resurrection experiences of the disciples, in which the risen

one is identified as the crucified one*

As the resurrection

overoomes the feeling of nihil and announces the esehatological*

it can be said to be a creatlo ex nlhftlo**5 This identity of
Jesus, found in the dialectic ofcross and resurrection, links
the esehatological with the historical—the abolition of the

law with the history of the promise* now given in a new context*

*•• • • the gospel which reveals the presence
of the coming Lord requires a continuity with
the earthly Jesus whieh has constantly to be
discovered anew—for otherwise a myth about
some new heavenly being threatens to take the
place of Jesus of Nasareth and the gospel

turns Into gnostic talk of revelation.**6

Tf one accepts that Jesus was a Jew and that the God of
the Jews raised him from the dead, then the connection with
the history of the promise becomes crucial* One cannot

anticipate the second coming of the risen Lord blindly*
It must have ground in the past*

C*

Political Theology and the "Spirit*

Now that we have a brief overview of the theology of
hope* two questions arise*

First, how is Christian escha

tology necessarily a political theology? Aren9t we being
dictated to in some way or other? The second question is
crucial to any theologian* From what experience of the
Christian faith are you speaking? It would seem that
Moltmann has shut out all form of spiritual communication

and embraced the rational, ethical dimensions of Christianity.

Political theology must be distinguished from
"politicising theologians" and "pietizing politicians" as
Moltmann says* It Is neither a religious justification of
the political order nor a religious deification of the
political order* Christianity has long fought against the
pagan gods of unknown soldiers* beloved forefathers* and the
like ever since Justin Martyr* But in recent times* the
church has become a private cult working hand In glove with
the political order* It takes on the function of unburdening
weary citizens, offering them a artificial feeling of human
community, soothing them in preparation for another week's
eojourn into soeiety* It appears that the church* in focusing
upon salvation of the soul and the individual tendency toward

pride* has neglected the collective* national* political
forms of pride which often spill over into violence* That
the "Bis: Powers'* have the capacity to wipe out life on earth
several tlaee over is a fact which bears repeating* So
political theology In this context is not of the bumper
sticker variety* It is more like the recent feeling of Hone
world" which characterises the peace and ecology movements*
A recent ecology slogan puts it nicelyt "We have made a world
for each of us, bat we need a world for all of us***

It takes

the form of an individual decision on the part of Christiana
and non-Christians to adopt an ethic based on the hope found
In esehatological faith—and not on a metaphysical system of
cosmologleal stagnancy* Such systems crumble with every
historical upheaval*

Why must Christian eschatology be political? To
paraphrase a quote by A*N* Whitehead concerning ideas may be
the most direct explanation! "Hope won*t keepi something
must be done with It*" We might addi concerning nuclear
disarmament, excessive per capita consumption, dehumanlzation
and environmental damage in Industries, poverty* It just
may be the ease that a serious attempt at these problems
would result in the decay of that economic empire once called
America* It just may be the case that recent romantic
movements of the "back to the land" type in the eounter-culture
{fiay net be fade* but the call for a style of living that does
not require the alienated forme of work our society demands
from all people at present* Whatever may prove to be the
case* it is clear that Christianity has a long Exodus ahead
of itself—assuming that Christians do no longer wish to be
handmaidens of a selfish system, and That they truly seek
that "eity which is to come"*

We turn now to the question of religious experience*
The uniqueness of the Judaeo-Christian experience lies in the
eaperienee of promise* Spirit is then an esehatological spirit,

as in the writings of Paul*

It is the life-giving Spirit* the

spirit that raised Christ from the dead and dwells in those

who recognise Christ and his future* and shall quicken their

aortal bodies (Rom* 8ill)*

It is the power of futurity In

anxious men* wanting to be free* "It ie the yearning* unfulfillment, anxiety, and suffering in matter Itself . . . The
formation of an esehatological or messianic understanding of
being will necessitate 1) understanding nature historically

10

and 2) understanding spirit materially and matter spiritually
To man*e •restless heart9 (Augustine) there corresponds a
•restless world*•" *7

SECTION TWOi

PAUL

The writings of the apostle Paul defy any theological
system*

They express not only the great difference between

Saul, the student of the Law, and Paul, the itinerant missionary*
but al*o how Paul combined those two seemingly opposed points
of view in his own faith* His letters juxtapose Gnostic
insights and techniques of Midrashi highly structured arguments
by allegory and chiasm (Rom. 2t?-lo) are found along with
primitive Christian creeds (Rom* It3-4, 1 Cor* 15*3-5)•
These stylistic meanderlngs are possible for one who is not

worried overmuch with system-building and its patron, St.
Coherency* Paul has practical Interests always in sight*

settling arguments, reassuring churches cast into doubt by
encounters with "superlative apostles" and other false teachers,
chastising other churches for their piety, and so on* He
appears in his letters as being -all things to all men" (1 Cor* 9*22)
for the sake of Christ and the gospel* It falls to the task of

theologians, however, to search Scripture continually in the
light of questions asked by modern men* Any denial of the
applicability of Scripture, as a totality, to the human
situation results In reading the Bible like a peek of tarot
cards—where the finger points lies the timeless answer to
the personal question*

Bearing in mind the danger of contorting Paul's thought
to fit a system, let us begin with the questiont From what
kind of religious experience is Paul speaking? One of the
first things that stands out in the Pauline writings is the
absence of references to the historical Jesus*

It is his

conversion experience on the Damascus road that takes prece
dence (2 Cor* 5*16). He did not receive the gospel "from
man, nor was I taught it, but it came through a revelation
of Jesus Christ" (Gal* It12). This, in addition to the
diaspora Jewish Christianity spread throughout the Jlellenistic world (as hinted at in Acts 6,7*8 and li) would seem to
lay a good foundation showing Paul's ties to Hellenism*

Passages such as Gal 3*27, which reads like a parallel to the
robing of an initiate in a Greek mystery religion, and Gal*
3t20, "it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in
me," together with 2 Cor* 3tl8, "And we all, with unveiled

face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed

into his likeness • • •" present a Christ-mysticism that
appears to stem from the Hellenisation of early Christianity
which Paul is continuing* In addressing the Roman church
(Rom* 6i3-6) Paul can already presuppose the sacrament of

11

baptism in a specific formula* The significant difference
here in the Pauline interpretation of baptism lies in the
symbolism* His formula does not correspond exactly to baptism*
for Jesu8# burial has to be used instead of his crucifixion*

But Paul did net Himself make that movei he only proclaimed
"Jesus Christ and him crucified" (1 Cor* 2t2)* Paul9e
theology is a theology of the cross, which includes the
experience of suffering for Christ (Col* 1*24) • Yet it is

interesting to note that his baptism formula does not corresSond in the same fashion* Perhaps this is because* for Paul*
aptlsm does not mediate salvation but is participation in
a cosmic event which is directed toward the time of the end*

Also noteworthy is the new eense of the word "initiation" in

Phil* 4tl2*
want*

Paul says he has been initiated into hunger and

This is a very literal usage* to be sure*

So Paul's "Christ-mysticism" is not the personal flight
to the divine* He does not deify himself* shutting out the
world* He includes the world eschatologically (1 Cor* 12ti3,

2 Cor* 10t7* Col* 3ill).

Christ must put all his enemies

under his feeti only then will he turn his rule over to God

(1 Cor* 15*25-28) • This element of the "not-yet" is strong
in Pauline literature* It is in this cosmic* esehatological
sense that the person "in Christ" is a "new creation" (2 Cor* 5tl7)»
The Pauline mysticism is one of community, not isolation*

In his mysticism, the consciousness of the separation between
God and man comes to the fore—the awareness of man*8 suspen
sion that generates the spiritual longing for the unredeemed
whole of creation.

An amaslng picture 1

Paul claims to have

touched the heights of Gnostic piety (see 2 Cor* 12) yet
plays it down* so that he may help make the divine message
accessible to all (1 Cor* l^tl8-19, and 26-33 especially)*

"Indeed I count everything as loss because of
the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my
Lord*

Por his sake I have suffered the loss of

all things* and count them ae refuse, in order
that I may gain Christ and be found in him* not
having a righteousness of my own* based on law,
but that which is through faith In Christ* the
righteousness from God that depends on faith*
that I may know him and the power of his resur
rection, and may share his sufferings* becoming

like him in his death, that if possible I may
attain the resurrection from the dead*"

(Phil* 3'8-U)

12

1 Cor* 15 is the keystone of the Pauline eschatology*

It

is made clear that "if the dead are not raised* then Christ
has not been raised" (verse 16)*

Christ is here set in the

context of the promise* He is its partial fulfillmentt
the final fulfillment awaite the end of the age* when we will
be raised with a "spiritual body" (verse W)*
Pauline literature has long been respected for its
insights into "original sin" and -justification by faith

working through grace".

But is it not Important to see

theee two eoneepts* long held dear to theologiana* in their
actual development centuries later? These concepts cannot

be attributed to Paul alone, but to Paul fig }& was seen by
the men of a particular age*

The question must arises

why

has the esehatological experiences of Paul been burled under

doctrine for so long? How is It that this early* collective,
cosmic vision was displaced by a radically individualistic
one in which God, after balancing a persons mortal ledger*
allows his soul to float like a balloon Into heaven?

The

answer* I think* is twofold• first* the question concerning
salvation has been put wrongly $ second, Christian theology
has yet to reconcile its tenets about death with the final
things* we turn to these problems now*

PART THREE t

THE RESURRECTION CP THE BODY AND PRE-RADIANCE

We have covered the collective vision of Christian

eschatology, its bearing upon the common fate of mankind*
the response of the individual to the promise in the social
sphere, and the Pauline eschatology of the cross* What
yet remains to be fit In the picture is the fate of an
individual upon death* and the bearing of that projected

fate upon his life* In this respect, Carl Braatenfs*8
criticism of the theology of hope indicates the problerat
when eschatology is made the keystone of theology* it has
strong ethical import upon the individual* but does not

leave him anything to hope fort

Gone in this esehatological

view is the comforting notion of the immortal souli in its
place* we have talk about an expected (but not imminent)

general resurrection*

Sueh talk* as talk of "withstanding

the contradiction of present and future"* falls short of

assuaging the individual*

The question Draaten takes up*

then* is one first raised by Immanuel Kantt

-What can I

hope?"

Moltmann, in an address given at Kalamazoo College*
Kalamazoo, Michigan, on October l<t* 1970, rephrased the

question*

His lecture was titled* "How can I play in a

strange land?"* This line* taken from a Negro spiritual*
parallels Psalm 137**• It represents a critical change of

i3

approach to the question of salvation*

Instead of

ignoring the political sphere in which soteriologieal
thinking takes place, Moltmann includes it as part of the

established order an esehatological Christianity must call
into question* So now* in place of the term "salvation"*,
we are confronted with two new symbolst "play" and "strange
land"*

What do these mean in Moitaannfs theological structure?

The -strange land" is actually 'the land we all live in*
It is a land where religious people imagine a heaven of
disembodied soul* that Is just as morbid as their present
existence in many ways* It is a land where religious people
rally behind those leaders who promise to give meaning to
their lives*

It is a land where the Christian church still

imagines it Is needed by society to be a stabiliser* (The
truth is, society doesn't need the church anymore—but finds
that it is still useful in its rapidly diminishing role as

a pacifier of the populace*)

Surprisingly enough* it is

a land where religious people are still seared of their own
deatht this is clearly demonstrated in the sway held over
them by their authorities*

Who has no fear of death cannot

be manipulated by superiors* All the foregoing might appear
like serious and revolutionary talk—especially since we have
been speaking of "political theology"* The answer is* wellit is and it isn't.

It is not talk of a revolution that wants

to replace one form of alienated society with another form*
It is talk concerning how Christians can work toward a humane

society without making an idol out of it* or turning it into
a mechanical gargoyle* The danger I speak of is the tendency
to take Utopian ideas that are this-worldly quite seriously*
Such seriousness rules out the vision of the Kingdom of God,
re-establishes the old bugbear of works-righteousness and
the consequent "pearly gates- concept of heaven—in short*

rules out the ability to work and yet laugh and play at the
same time*

It is for this reason that Moltmann* in hie address*

introduced the question* "Can believers play in a world
where there is so much suffering?"* Certainly it is true
that those who are incapable of grieving are superficial
optimists* Those kind we have no need for* But what about
the other side of the eoint take ourselves, the ordinary
people* Can we play? Is our society structured for aesthetic
enjoyment? The answer is no* Our spirits are out of joint
with the spontaneity of freedom* We cannot play without
realising what we are bound to* our work*

We cannot take a

vacation without knowing that we are expected to increase
productivity on "the line" when we return*

Further* it is

a faet of history that play* or rather,occasional suspensions
of oppressive restrictions, has been used as a "safety valve"
by power structures. It lets off steam that might have been
used in some insurrectory activity.

1*

It is precisely In this situation that eschatology
can and does have great personal meaning* Individual hope
takes the form of "pre-radiance", a spontaneous ability to
enjoy the aesthetic side of life* While most of our play
activities are still alienated encounters* as explained
previously* they are nevertheless encounters* As such*
they offer an alternative environment to the workaday world
we too often think to be the only possible mode of existence.
Through art forms such as drama (one thinks here of Bertolt
Breeht), satire, folk dance, and so en* nan realises that

matters donft have to be the way they are* Eschatology
conceives of the end as finally being free from purpose*
We expeet a new body penetrated by the spirit* a new
innocence analogous to but not identical with that innocence
of children* We become like a child* and exude the primal
trust children are known for* This pre-radiance of God»s
new creation does not spiritualise or moralise* Isntt it
true that we always speak with the Intention to get someone
to do something? Instead, this grace or pre-radiance Is

manifested in the body*

Is It not a contradiction that, while we think there is
a reason for everything in the world—we are at odds to find

a reason for the world Itself? The man who neede goale tries
to reconcile the theodicy question with the creation* and

finally collapses into that theological quagmire called the

"doctrine of the devil"* The choice ie actually very simplei
recognise that God created the world out of his "good pleasure",
that existence is already meaningful in itself—or add another
branch to dogmatics called "Satanology", with all its morbid
consequences*

"How about the crucifixion?" one may ask* Here* admittedly,
the esthetic categories break down* Certainly the cross ie
?uite serious* and does not belong in the category of "play"*

et is it not true that it makes new play possible? Perhaps

there also was no compelling reason for God^s revelation in

Christ—that grace is not a reparation for human guilt* but
an esehatological bonding* as in Paul* There is something of
the aesthetic in the Easter celebrations, it should be notedt

the lighter and song which erupts when we realise that death
Ji*eirJ*» *£* »°eked. We go back to the dialectic of the
identity of Christi suffering and laughter, unbelief and
transforming new faith are juxtaposed in his person* crucified
and risen for us* Can we not in the same fashion laugh in
the midst of unredeemdd humanity* and feel the pain of "not-yet"
in the aldet of joy?
*
^ -* Ecology, in interpreting what "eternal life" is* must
S!^J? t<\.tuF\2,*3f fT *** -iaaortal soul- and consider the
Pauline "spiritual body"t for it is in this symbol that
lies the close eonneetlon between this life and the "new
life" we anticipate*

FOOTNOTES

1*

Moltmann, Jurgen* Theology of Hone, New York, 196?*
p* 271*

2.

Ibid* p* 92*

3*

Ibid, p. 229 (cf* also pp. 288-9)*

*• 2£14» *« 89»
5*

Ibid, p. 48*

6*

Ibid* p. 51*

7.

Ibid, p* 82-3*

8* Ibid, p* 85*
9*

Ibid, p. 100*

10.

Ibid, p* 117*

11*

(cf* p* 13<0

12*

Ibid, p. 136

13*

Ibid, p* 152*3*

14*

Ibid, p. 153*

15*

Ibid, p* 198*

16*

Ibid, p* 300*

17. Woltmann* Jurgen, -Hope and History*" Hfteejogv Today,
vol* 25, October* 19681 p. 383*

18*

Braaten, Carl, "Toward a Theology of Hope*" Theology
Today, vol* Zk0 July, 1967i p. 208.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books

LI fa Against Death ♦

Brown, N.O.

Middletown, Conn.t

Wesleyan University Press, 1959•
Dibelius, Martin and Kunmel, w.G.
Westminster Press, 1953*

Paul,

Philadelphiai

Weeks. Wayne, editor. Tfro "rtttofig 9t ?y ffflwV New York!
W*W, Norton A Coapany, 1972*

Moltuarai, Jargon.

Hone and Planning»

New Yorki

Harper A Row, 1971*

Ctuaries serionera sons, 1970,
•

Theology of Hone,

Translated by James *• Leitch*

New York i Harper ft Row. 1967.
Articles

Braaten, CB.

"Toward a Theology of Hope,-

Theology Today>

24 (July, 1967), 208-26,
Moltmann, Jurgen.

-Hope and History,-

Theology Today.

25 (October, 1968), 369*86,

• •Political Theology.-

TtWlvfSf ?9fl*Y> 28

(April, 1971)• 6-23.
.

-Resurrection as Hope,-

61 (April, 1968), 129-$7.

Harvard Theological Review*

. -Towards a Political Hemeneutioe of the Gospel,~Unlon SeH><n-rY qmrtorlv »«vi—» 23 (July, 1968), 303-23.
Other Sources

Tape Recording (#310) of a lecture by Jurgen Moltmann,
-How can I play in a strange land?-, given at
Kalawasoo College. October 14, 1970, Tape
available at Upjohn Library desk, Kalamazoo
College, Kalaaasoo, Michigan*

APPMJDIX TO THE BELIEF POfifORI OF "THEOLOGY OF HOPE"

The Brief Purport was written for people who. I had assumed,
shared a certain amount of sympathy for Christian theology and its
claims* How that it is being evaluated by men who are concerned
with the basic presuppositions of its content, some extra "bridgework" is required* The following essay intends to lay down the

critique of modern philosophy as presented by Jurgen Uoltmann and

other political theologianso

At the end of I^ichael Gelven's commentary on Heidegger's

"Being and Time" is added a postscript entitled "Why Existence?"*
It outlines why the emphasis on existential themes is due to the

nature of philosophical inquiry itself* It traces the theme of
transcendence as human freedom through Kant's "noumenal realm of

practical reason", Nietzsche's "transvaluatlon of all values" and
Heidegger's incorporation of the two in Being, and 21m&* His
contribution to modern thought is twofold:

it is an extension of

Kant in supplying a more fundamental critique of technical reason,
and an extension of Nietzsche in supplying a way to grasp the
structure of one's own existence* Yet these are given new status

in Heidegger1 s pheno&enological analysis of "worldhood", "under
standing" and "temporality" — all grounded in the structure of
finite Dasein* Against the deification of both Aristotelian meta
physics and technical reason. Heidegger stresses the importance of
the ways in which man comports himself, since this is the ground
of his freedom and transcendence*

Political theology attempts a critique of this view of trans
cendence as freedomo This iaerkegaardian-Nietzschean-Heldegserian
view is at once oblivious to the unfree conditions of present reality

and reliant upon a diminished notion of transcendence* The diminished
notion appears most strongly when we consider finite man's place in
unfinished world history* According to Heidegger, the totalization
of all particular moments and parts of history is not to be sought in
a future end of world history, but is to be decided in one's historical
ability to be Integral in the face of death* This indicates that
meaning is found only in the present — which implies a statement

about history as such* It is a shift from the actuality of historical
events to a mere inquiry into what makes history possible*

The result

is a reiflcation of history, history regarded as pure knowledge* *»

the attempt to know the ground of history through the temporal structure
of Dasein, the real character of history is concealed*
For history moves for human perception out of

the wc&m of. mJ ng into the mode at hnv1ng,o

We

always frp^p history more, since we always can

have and comprehend the past more*

But then

we are no longer historical in the open processes
of the present*'

Violtmann, Jurgen* RftUglon, Bpvnlntlnn and iha JEutuxa, p* 5^

History doesn't stand still long enough to be summed up*
Yet the problem of being and having is not merely historical, but
also personal*

Two questions are opposed to each other:

How can

one identify with one's bodily life, considering all the suffering
and death it brings? And yet, how can one live at all, if one
does not identify with one's mortal being? Heidegger's analysis
of inauthentic existence treats the second question seriously*
One does not merely "have" time or "have" a body — ha "Is" both
of them* VJhen one does not identify with his body and his finltude,
he becomes estranged to himself* Seperated from the question of

"what it means to be", he merges into the everyday environment where
all things are replaceable and human relationships interchangeable*
The first question, however, remains ignored* It is a question
about man's existence that points beyond the realm of appearance

to the noumenal realm, which Kant reserved solely for duty*

It is

the question of theodicy*

The response of Political Theology to the theodicy question
is one oriented to both finltude and the non-finite realm from
which the future "breaks in". Political theology, like Marxism.

wants religion to wither away - - but stresses that it will wither
away only when it has been fulfilled* Thus the orientation toward

the future* One Christian future (or eschatology) must be identified
with a transformation of the conditions of history itselfj it is not

a mere succeeding event to history, but its highest stage of develop
ment* Uoltmann agrees with Marxism that the basic problem is not

only the myth which is a realization of human existence in fantasy,
but also the reality which forces man to deceive himself* VJhen

the expressive side of myth holds sway over the protest function it
also has, the Cross becomes a burden for the oppressed to carry for
their masters*

The announcement of hope in the Resurrection must be

identified with the utter negativity of the Cross, or the connection
with the earthly Jesus is lost*

The Christian hermeneutic is praxis-oriented*

It does not

wish to be formalistic, or concerned with "written expressions of

life" only* It seeks to understand all historical expressions of
life within a political context* It seeks to make the static

dualism of modern metaphysics fluid once again* the dualism, that
is. between causal scientific and philosophical views of the world*

This is being done in the theoretical realm by "sociologists of
sociology", who are studying crisis situations in social science
where one paradigm is threatened with a new view* In such a case.

data collection is suspended and forces mount on both sides for the

battle of persuasion* It is an eplstemological conversion experience*
Returning to the "Brief Purport", I wish to substantiate the

claim of this modem dualism (which shuts out the history of the

physical world *- amid the turmoil in the anthropological sphere,

environmentalists remind us that man is also a "piece of world") by

tracing it back to antithetical interpretations of Kant's CMtlqna

Kant was a kind of dualist himself, making a distinction

between noumena and phenomena*

This distinction was necessary

in order to show the a priori nature of both mathematics and

natural science* In his search for the limits of knowledge, Kant
had to presume that the world "in Itself" is not known; what we
find is the world as it appears under the imposition of our order

upon it*

Heidegger shows that finite human understanding directs
itself to a world that is already present, or "given"* It is this
finltude which characterizes our knowledge:

the objects of our

understanding are not created by us but are received.

In other

words, "thinking Is in the service of intuition" — an intuition

made finite by its characteristic receptivity.

In interpreting

the Crltlqiifl at Enrja Sacson as a foundation for ontological, not

ontic knowledge, Heidegger tries to show that the transcendental

imagination is the unifying faculty of sensihility, understanding
and reason*

Because this unity of pure knowledge occurs "earlier",

Kant erred in seeking the origin of the categories through the table
of judgments* The transcendental Imagination is prior to transcen
dental apperception (which seems to be the «*>g<*n for Kant)* It
does not intend schemata in the way understanding intends concepts,
but is "pre-thematic"» It supplies the schemata which supply the
Images for conceptualization. The schemata themselves are not images*

but "transcendental determinations of time" (Kemp Smith trans*, p* 18i),

Heidegger claims that forms of intuition as well as the categories of
the understanding have their origin in the transcendental Imagination.
The temporal structure of the transcendental imagination, through
pure syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, disclose
senses of past, present and future respectively*
Ernst Casslrer of the Neo-Kantian school offers a rebuttal*

According to him, Heidegger fails to acknowledge the independent
character of thought* The understanding is not dependent upon
intuition to the point that i t loses its independence. When Heidegger
relates the transcendental imagination to temporal existence, the
distinctions between sensuality and intelligibility as well as those
of phenomena and noumena, are done away with* The ideas of reason
are not referential to intuition, but to understanding and its uses,
seeking to systematically unify experience* It is the path of the
active reason, not the path of passive receptivity, which leads Kant
to the noumenal realm* While Casslrer agrees the transcendental
imagination is Important, he does not feel i t is central.
Casslrer intellectual!zes Kant and Heidegger sensualizes him*

Yet while Heidegger doesn't say much about the role of reason, Casslrer
drops his argument precisely at this same point*

Reason is not an

Illusion, yet when it seeks to affirm the unity of subjective and
objective conditions of experience, it runs into severe problems*
As C* 0. Schrag concludes in his article "Heidegger and Casslrer on
Kant"t

The transcendental imagination does not "create"

the ideas through schemata, but it doaa "create"

them, and it creates them in a way not dissimilar

from the way in which it "creates" the moral law.1

We arrive at the dualism:

a scientific, third-person view

that is at heart transcendental —

and a counter-assertion of human

finltude that, strangely enough, releases the soul which has become
homeless in its own world, allowing It to drift outside, where it is
recaptured in various escapist methods of transcendence*

We have

lost the ability to hold immanence and transcendence in tension, in
sliort.

The stabilization of immanence accomplished by existentialism

resulted in the free |>lay of transcendence in Romantic religious
consciousness*

It is aov time to ask i f these declarations of

fulfillment coincide with the ability of the modern subjectivity
to rule i t s own world*

As me&'s own being is simply not yet complete, neither is
his view of the world* The notion of the world as aoaa, one coming,
one passing away* does not measure up to the critical philosophy of

Kant in epistemological terms.

But If the way in which one views

the world affects his response to it, political theology may prove
to be the view most conducive for social change — even though it

has nothing to add to eplstemology.

The advancing future calls us to respond in hopa*

Not agnostic

caution, or blessed assurance, or scientific prediction*

1Schrag, C* 0.

Hope*

"Heidegger and Casslrer on Kant," IfantfiturUfffi, 58

Jahrgang, Heft 1, s* 87-100.

